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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
   
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 16-2240 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
NORIAN CORPORATION; SYNTHES, INC., 
           Appellants 
___ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (Criminal No.: 2:09-cr-00403-001 and 2:09-cr-00403-002) 
District Judge:  The Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 14, 2017 
 
Before:  SMITH, Chief Judge, NYGAARD, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 8, 2017) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
In 2003 and 2004 two patients died during spine surgery where bone cement 
manufactured by the defendants, Norian Corporation and its parent company, Synthes, 
                                                          
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Inc. (collectively “Synthes”), were used.  These and other deaths led the government to 
initiate a criminal investigation into Synthes’s marketing practices.  This investigation 
culminated in the empaneling of a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and 
Synthes, as well as several of its high-level executives, pled guilty to unlawful off-brand 
marketing of its bone cement in violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.  In 2014, 
the estates of the two patients who died in 2003 and 2004 filed a civil wrongful death 
lawsuit in California state court against Synthes and its executives.  In preparing for its 
defense, Synthes petitioned the court for certain grand jury materials.  The District Court 
denied Synthes’s petition for failure to demonstrate a particularized need.  Because we 
find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion, we will affirm.   
I. 
Between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, Synthes manufactured and marketed 
two generations of bone cement called Norian SRS (“Skeletal Repair System”) and 
Norian XR, for use in orthopedic surgeries to fill bone voids.  The Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) approved these medical devices for use as a general bone filler, 
but expressly did not approve their use in spines, and required a warning that it should 
not be used in such a way on its label.  Despite this clear directive from the FDA, 
however, Synthes nonetheless marketed its bone cement for use in vertebroplasty, a 
surgical procedure that treats fractures of the spine.   
This off-label use, at the encouragement of Synthes sales representatives, led to 
several patient deaths and spurred a criminal investigation of Synthes and several high-
level executives.  After a grand jury proceeding in 2009, the government charged Synthes 
 3 
 
and the executives with conspiracy to defraud the federal government,1 and charged 
Synthes with criminal violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.2  All defendants 
pled guilty to all charges, and the individuals were sentenced in November 2011.   
In 2014, the estates of two of the patients who died during vertebroplasties in 2003 
and 2004 filed a wrongful-death action in California state court against Synthes and 
several of its former executives.  The plaintiffs allege that the decedents’ deaths were 
caused by the off-label use of Norian SRS and Norian XR in their vertebroplasties, and 
that the bone cement would not have been used but for Synthes’s assurance that the 
products were FDA-approved for this particular indication.  During discovery for that 
case, one of the treating surgeons, Dr. Nottingham, testified in a deposition that he 
specifically recalls being told by both a Synthes sales representative and a Synthes 
executive that Norian XR was FDA-approved for use in vertebroplasties.  He further 
testified that, as a result of this reassurance, he used the bone cement in the vertebroplasty 
for one of the decedents, despite the warning on the label that it should not be so used.   
Seeking to undermine this testimony, Synthes petitioned the court for certain 
grand jury materials in the hope that they will contradict, or at least call into question, the 
reliability of Dr. Nottingham’s recollection of the events that occurred over a decade ago.  
After reviewing the grand jury materials at issue in camera, the District Court denied the 
                                                          
1 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
2 18 U.S.C. § 331. 
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petition.3  Synthes moved for reconsideration, which was also denied.  Synthes timely 
appealed both orders.4   
III.5 
 It is long established that, “in order to preserve the freedom and integrity of the 
deliberative process” during grand jury proceedings, Rule 6(e) protects from disclosure 
“matters occurring before the grand jury.”6  The “policy of secrecy is not absolute,” 
however.7  Disclosures may be granted “preliminary to or in connection with a judicial 
                                                          
3 We have requested the materials that the District Court reviewed in camera and took 
them into consideration. 
4 Though Synthes’s petition was filed under a criminal rule of procedure on a criminal 
docket, we nonetheless conclude that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4), tolling 
the time for appeal in a civil case until after disposition of a motion for reconsideration, 
applies.  “Proceedings to enforce civil rights are civil proceedings, and proceedings for 
the punishment of crimes are criminal proceedings.”  Ex Parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 
559 (1883).  Here, the only pending issue is whether grand jury materials may be 
disclosed to Synthes to help it defend itself in a separate civil action—an undoubtedly 
civil “right” though it implicates criminal rules of procedure.  In re Special Grand Jury 
89-2, 450 F.3d 1159, 1169 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Campbell, 294 F.3d 824, 
827 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Miramontez, 995 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir. 1993). 
5 We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which we review for 
abuse of discretion.  Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. 
McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 1989).  An abuse of discretion occurs when the 
District Court applies an “errant conclusion of law, an improper application of law to 
fact, or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.”  Wiest, 710 F.3d at 128. 
6 In re Grand Jury Investigation (N.J. State Comm’n of Investigation), 630 F.2d 996, 
1000 (3d Cir. 1980) (hereinafter “SCI”). 
7 Id. 
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proceeding,”8 so long as the requesting party can demonstrate “a particularized need for 
that information which outweighs the public interest in secrecy.”9     
In its initial petition, Synthes requested (1) “Grand Jury testimony and memoranda 
of interviews of Dr. Paul Nottingham and Dr. Hieu Ball (the ‘Doctors’) and S. Michael 
Sharp (‘Dr. Sharp’);” (2) “documents produced to the Grand Jury by the Doctors or 
reviewed by the Doctors during the Grand Jury proceedings;” and (3) “documents 
reviewed by Dr. Sharp in preparation for or during the Grand Jury proceedings.” 10  The 
District Court denied this petition in part.   
Synthes, on a motion for reconsideration, brought a different, more refined 
petition.  Instead of asking for all grand jury testimony and interview memoranda, it 
sought only portions of Dr. Nottingham’s interview memoranda and grand jury testimony 
reflecting his understanding of the FDA status of the bone cement at the time of the 
surgery.  And instead of all documents the Doctors produced to the grand jury, now it 
sought only “copies of any medical records, doctors’ notes, calendar appointments or 
other documents dated prior to the initiation of the grand jury investigation that were 
produced by Drs. Nottingham or Ball to the grand jury.”11  The District Court denied this 
motion for reconsideration because “[n]one of the narrow reasons for granting 
                                                          
8 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i).   
9 United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted).   
10 A 76.   
11 A 235.  Because the District Court granted disclosure of “any business records 
belonging to [Synthes], which Sharp returned to the” government, A 24, it dropped its 
third request for all documents reviewed by Dr. Sharp. 
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reconsideration,”12 which are limited to “correct[ing] a clear error of law or [] 
prevent[ing] a manifest injustice in the District Court’s original ruling,”13 applied.   
On appeal, Synthes brings three arguments: first, that the portions of the interview 
memoranda that were not disclosed to the grand jury are not subject to grand jury secrecy 
under Rule 6(e); second, that business records, even though they were examined by the 
grand jury, are not subject to Rule 6(e) because they were independently created; and 
third, the District Court erred in finding that it has not demonstrated a particularized need 
for these documents.  We disagree. 
First, we reject Synthes’s argument that memoranda of interviews conducted in 
preparation for a grand jury investigation are not subject to grand jury secrecy so long as 
they were not presented to the grand jury.  Rule 6(e) extends grand jury secrecy to all 
“[r]ecords, orders, and subpoenas relating to grand-jury proceedings.”14  The touchstone 
is not what has been examined by the grand jury, but what may reveal “the essence of 
what takes place in the grand jury room.”15  The District Court, after reviewing the 
                                                          
12 A 28. 
13 Id. (quoting United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010)).  
14 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(6) (emphasis added).   
15 SCI, 630 F.2d at 1000; see In re Grand Jury Matter (Garden Court Nursing Home, 
Inc.), 697 F.2d 511, 512-13 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding that prosecution summaries of the 
defendant’s books and records are subject to grand jury secrecy because the conclusions 
were likely revealed to the grand jury and because these summaries do not exist 
independently of the grand jury process); United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 107 (2d 
Cir. 2017) (finding that a letter describing a grand jury investigation—which was not 
presented to a grand jury—nonetheless falls under Rule 6(e)).  But see In re Grand Jury 
Matter (Catania), 682 F.2d 61, 64 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding that materials that were the 
product of an FBI investigation, that “were not generated by the grand jury, and were not 
requested or subpoenaed by the grand jury,” and were likely not ever presented before the 
grand jury are not subject to grand jury secrecy rule). 
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requested documents in camera, concluded “the information contained in the memoranda 
relates to what transpired before the grand jury.”16  Having reviewed the same documents 
in camera, we concur in the District Court’s finding.   
Second, we similarly reject Synthes’s argument that the medical records it seeks 
fall outside the secrecy requirements of Rule 6(e).  It is true that “business records . . . 
created for purposes independent of grand jury investigations,” which “have many 
legitimate uses unrelated to the substance of the grand jury proceedings,” are not subject 
to Rule 6(e) merely because they were reviewed by a grand jury.”17  And we have 
granted disclosure of documents presented to grand juries “[w]hen testimony or data is 
sought for its own sake—for its intrinsic value in the furtherance of a lawful 
investigation—rather than to learn what took place before the grand jury.”18   
But that is not the request before us.  Synthes did not simply request business and 
medical records generated by Dr. Nottingham and Dr. Ball, which only incidentally were 
presented to a grand jury.  Instead, Synthes sought only documents “produced to the 
Grand Jury.”19  This is precisely the type of “general request for all documents collected 
or received in connection with” a grand jury investigation that “would be in effect a 
disclosure of the grand jury proceedings.”20  Synthes’s requests make clear that the 
                                                          
16 A 34.   
17 SCI, 630 F.2d at 1000. 
18 Id. at 1001 (quoting United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, 280 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 
1960)). 
19 A 76; A 235. 
20 United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285, 291 n.6 (7th Cir. 1978).       
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documents are not sought for their own intrinsic value; their significance lies only in their 
significance to the grand jury.21   
Having decided that all of the documents sought are subject to Rule 6(e), we now 
turn to Synthes’s third argument: the District Court erred in finding that Synthes did not 
carry its burden of demonstrating “particularized need that outweighs the public’s interest 
in secrecy.”22  To prove particularized need, the party must demonstrate that (1) “the 
material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding;” 
(2) “the need for disclosure is greater than the need for secrecy;” and (3) “their request is 
structured to cover only the materials so needed.”23   
As Synthes correctly asserts, the Supreme Court has recognized that “the typical 
showing of particularized need arises when a litigant seeks to use the ‘grand jury 
transcript at the trial to impeach a witness, to refresh his collection, to test his credibility 
and the like,’” so as to “avoid misleading the trier of fact.”24  However, the mere 
incantation that the requested materials are needed to impeach a witness is not enough.  
The moving party must point to actual inconsistencies that could be remedied by the 
requested grand jury materials, the disclosure of which is needed to avoid possible 
injustice in the separate judicial proceeding.25  In determining whether particularized 
                                                          
21 Id.  
22 McDowell, 888 F.2d at 289. 
23 Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979).   
24 Id. at 222 n.12 (quoting Untied States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 
(1958)).   
25 See In re Special Grand Jury 89-2, 143 F.3d 565, 571 (10th Cir. 1998); In re Grand 
Jury Testimony (Doe), 832 F.2d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Fischbach & 
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need has been demonstrated and whether that need outweighs the public need for secrecy, 
the District Court is afforded substantial discretion.26   
Based on the record, we conclude that the District Court’s denial of the petition 
was not an abuse of discretion.  Three reasons support this conclusion.  First, we agree 
with the District Court that Synthes failed to convincingly point to an actual 
inconsistency warranting disclosure of grand jury materials to avoid possible injustice.  
The alleged discrepancy is between Dr. Nottingham’s deposition testimony that an 
“unspecified executive expressly reassured him that the proposed use [of the bone cement 
in vertebroplasty] was ‘on-label,’” and the absence of reference to this conversation in the 
contemporaneous documents recounting the aftermath of the surgery.27  This is not an 
actual discrepancy.  These documents were Synthes’s records put together by product 
development that were primarily concerned about the medical reasons for a fatality—
hardly the place to document an incriminating conversation.  Even so, one document 
notes that “[t]he surgeon denied any knowledge of Norian XR being in its Limited 
Release/Test Market Phase.  . . . He claimed the sales consultant ‘pushed’ this product on 
                                                          
Moore, Inc., 776 F.2d 839, 845 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d 840, 846 
(4th Cir. 1984).  
26 Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222. 
27 Petitioner Br. at 20-21; A 138-139.   
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him and was unclear as to its status on the market.”28  This appears to be consistent with 
the main thrust of Dr. Nottingham’s deposition testimony. 
Second, we are not persuaded that the requested grand jury material is truly the 
only source of information that could elucidate “whether [Synthes] misled Dr. 
Nottingham about [] Norian XR.”29  Dr. Nottingham testified that he spoke to two people 
at Synthes about the FDA status of the bone cement—a sales representative who attended 
the surgery and an executive with whom he spoke over the phone.  Surely those 
individuals may be able to shine some light on what occurred.  Furthermore, the nurse 
who assisted in the surgery and was the one who finally read aloud the warning label on 
the Norian XR may also have valuable information.  We have no doubt that the requested 
grand jury materials are relevant, and maybe even helpful, but “[t]he rule governing 
disclosure of grand jury testimony ‘is not to be used as a substitute for general 
discovery.’”30   
Finally, even if Synthes has demonstrated some need for the requested materials,31 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that its need does not outweigh 
                                                          
28 A 229.  
29 Id.  
30 In re Lynde, 922 F.2d 1448, 1453-54 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Evans 
& Assocs. Const. Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 656, 658 (10th Cir. 1988)). 
31 We note that Synthes failed, in its initial petition, to “structure[] [its request] to cover 
only material so needed.”  Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222.  It attempted to rectify this 
problem on its motion for reconsideration by submitting a narrower request.  However, a 
motion for reconsideration is simply not the appropriate vehicle to bring what is 
essentially a new request; these motions are limited to “correct[ing] a clear error of law or 
[] prevent[ing] a manifest injustice in the District Court’s original ruling.”  Dupree, 617 
F.3d at 732.   
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the public’s need for secrecy.  The grand jury investigation at issue here has been 
concluded for many years, and while “the interests in grand jury secrecy [are] reduced,” 
they “are not eliminated.”32  “For in considering the effects of disclosure on grand jury 
proceedings, the courts must consider not only the immediate effects upon a particular 
grand jury, but also the possible effect upon the functioning of future grand juries.”33  
The interest in secrecy in this case remains great.  Synthes is hoping to use grand jury 
materials to undermine the credibility of Dr. Nottingham, a key witness during the grand 
jury proceeding, and to impliedly shift blame for the death of his patient to him, away 
from Synthes.  This is precisely the kind of “future retribution” that could chill the candor 
of future grand jury witnesses.  While this need for secrecy is not insurmountable, it has 
not been overcome in this case.  
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders. 
                                                          
32 Douglas Oil, 411 U.S. at 222.  
33 Id. 
